DEMOCRACY

Democracy: Terminological contestability and the liberal assumption

Abstract

Democracy is predominantly seen as the most appropriate form of government for a State. However, the almost unanimity of this statement obscures the problems linked to democracy, in particular, the different characteristics between governments categorized as being democratic, but which, essentially, are different from each other. There is, therefore, an established conclave regarding the definition and constituent elements of this form of government. This obstacle, positioned at a theoretical level but with practical repercussions, is commonly addressed by identifying “democracy” as an essentially contested term and, therefore, enabling its conformation into a series of frames. The essay uses a bibliographical review on the topic to discuss the contestability of the term “democracy”, specifically, how academic literature understands that there are types and subtypes of the “democracy” genre, but which are essentially based on the axiom of liberal democracy. This assumption, consequently, generates the exclusion of certain conformations that challenge the liberal model. It is concluded, in general terms, that there is reluctance to attribute the “title” of democracy to forms of government that do not adopt a liberal world view as a presupposition, however, this timidity ends up ignoring the very logic of contestability and constitutes a fallacy given the very assumption of variability on which it is based.