The conclusion of the administrative contract of service and continuous supply according to Law Nº 14.133/21

an analysis in the light of the principle of competitiveness

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the possibility of there being a restriction on the principle of competitiveness when concluding an administrative contract, for a longer period, of service and continuous supply in accordance with Lei de Licitações e Contratos Administrativos (Law No. 14,133/21). This topic was chosen after verifying that contracting for too long a period could harm the choice of the most advantageous proposal and make it impossible to apply the principle of competitiveness, thus harming the public interest. Therefore, the question remains to what extent tenders can be understood as necessary instruments for the realization of human rights through the actions of the Public Power. When investigating the results obtained from the research, it is clear that when concluding contracts for long periods, the administrator will have no reason to hold a new event in a short period, restricting competition between potential interested parties, thus harming the applicability of the principle of competitiveness and, consequently, making it impossible to obtain a more advantageous proposal for the Public Administration, thus harming the public interest. The work was developed using a deductive approach and monographic procedure, with bibliographic and documentary research techniques. To this end, a review of the literature on bidding, the principle of competitiveness and administrative contract was carried out, in addition to collecting data relating to Law nº 14,133/21.