Naturalização da Fenomenologia e perspectivas metodológicas na pesquisa experimental em Psicologia
Palabras clave:
Cognição, Fenomenologia, Metodologia, Psicologia experimentalResumen
O artigo explora a relação entre Fenomenologia e Ciências Cognitivas a partir da literatura internacional denominada naturalização da fenomenologia. São discutidas as tendências de pesquisa na área. O estudo contrasta a pesquisa com métodos introspectivos da metodologia básica em Ciências Cognitivas e Fenomenologia Experimental. Nas tendências de naturalização da Fenomenologia, destaca-se a Fenomenologia front-loaded, caracterizada como um tipo de fenomenologia experimental, que utiliza a fenomenologia filosófica para informar e redefinir desenhos experimentais na pesquisa com processos psicológicos básicos. A prerrogativa do modelo front-loaded é o fomento de variações experienciais em seres humanos, por meio de ilusões perceptivas e desempenho cognitivo, sob condições de controle experimental. Ao final, são discutidos os limites da relação entre Fenomenologia e Ciências Cognitivas, apontando a distinção necessária entre Fenomenologia como ciência de fundação e Fenomenologia como pré-ciência experimental aberta ao diálogo interdisciplinar
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Derechos de autor 2023 Vera Engler CURY
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
