ACERCA DOS PRESSUPOSTOS INDIVIDUALISTAS E HOLISTAS DA TEORIA A CARTESIANA DA EVIDENCIA

Abstract

Our aim, in this paper, is to make a critical inquiry into Descartes 'theory of evidence. From an epistemological point of view,
clearness and distinctness may be conceived in two ways: l. As heuristic devices whose main function is to evaluate,
through an one-by-one process, unitary claims of knowledge.

2. As a mere rule of method whose epistemic value is alse defined by its position-function in the whole of the philosophical Principles organizing Descartes’ System. In the first case, Descartes' theory of evidence may be qualified as the highest principle of his methodological framework, aiming at evaluating separate claims of knowledge. (epistemological individualism), whereas in the second case we may construe his criterion of clearness and distinctness as a mere unit of his tacit epistemological holism. According to our point of view, we fail to understand Descartes’ theory of evidence if we are unable to realize that its foundations are holistic, that its rationality is consequence of the relations it maintains with the primis notionibus of cartesian substantive system of philosophy.