A MORALIDADE E SUA FUNDAMENTAÇÃO RACIONAL SUBJETIVIDADE VESUS INTERSUBJETIVIDADE

Abstract

In this text it is put forward two possible ways of rational foundation for Morality: the subjective and the intersubjective they are examined under the philosophy of Kant and Habermas. Each one of those positions is evaluated as far as the question of offering a rational foundation for morality is concerned. It is also examined in what extent the concepts of subject and intersubjectivity are complementaries to each other. It is argued that, under one aspect, both concepts are complementary to each other, as far as the meaning of moraIÊty for the philosophy of subject it is not the same for the philosophy of intersubjectivity. It is argued for the existence of a real dispute between both concepts when the plausibility of each concept to offer a rational foundation for morality is considered.